• Rationalizations and Political Polarization with Yves Le Yaouanq and Peter Schwardmann, CESifo working paper no. 11897 (May 2025).
  [.pdf]     Abstract
  We present a self- and social-signaling model formalizing findings in political psychology that moral and political judgments stem primarily from intuition and emotion, while reasoning serves to rationalize these intuitions to maintain an image of impartiality. In social interactions, agents’ rationalizations are strategic complements: others’ rationalizations weaken their ability to judge critically and make their actions less revealing of (inconvenient) truths. When agents are naive about their own rationalizations, our model predicts ideological and affective polarization, with each side assigning inappropriate motives to the other. Cross-partisan exchanges of narratives reduce polarization but are avoided by the agents. In within-group exchanges agents favor skilled speakers, whose narratives worsen polarization. Our model explains partisan disagreements over policy consequences, aligns with empirical polarization trends, and offers insights into efforts to disrupt echo chambers.
   
  
  
• Giving as a Self-Control Problem with Cristina Figueroa, Jantsje Mol and Ivan Soraperra, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 023/25.
  [.pdf]     Abstract
  Social preferences depend on emotional states like compassion and anger. Since emotions are fleeting and subject to manipulation, they may generate demand for commitment. We investigate the use of commitment strategies in an online experiment (n = 1,400), where subjects decide to watch or avoid videos before engaging in a charitable giving task. We find that a video with emotional content increases giving, but is also avoided more than non-emotional videos. We estimate a structural model of state-dependent social preferences, and show evidence for sophisticated commitment to selfishness and altruism. We argue that giving can be fruitfully analyzed as a self-control problem.
   
  
  
• Do People Distinguish Income from Wealth Inequality? Evidence from the Netherlands with Thomas Douenne and Oda Sund, World Inequality Lab working paper 2024/15.
  [.pdf]     Abstract
  In most countries, wealth inequality is much higher than income inequality, spurring debates about wealth taxation. However, it is unclear if voters are aware of these differences. In a large- scale survey experiment among a representative Dutch population (N=4,501), we study voters’ perceptions of income and wealth distributions, and connect their views to administrative data about their own income and wealth. Despite a primer on the definition of income and wealth, respondents underestimate the difference between the top 10% share of income and wealth by a factor of 10. Moreover, they use information about the income distribution to make predictions about the wealth distribution and vice versa, even when information about both is provided, further demonstrating confusion about the two types of inequality. An information intervention about actual inequality levels and personal ranks in the income/wealth distribution has an impact on the perceived inequality and perceived fairness of inequality, but little effect on policy preferences. We discuss implications for political debates about inequality and wealth taxation.
   
  Media: VoxEU
  
  
• Correcting Consumer Misperceptions about CO2 Emissions with Taisuke Imai, Davide D. Pace and Peter Schwardmann, CESifo working paper 10138.
  [.pdf]     Abstract
  Policy makers put great emphasis on the role of information about carbon emissions in achieving sustainable decisions by consumers. We conduct two studies to understand the optimal targeting of such information and its effects. First, we conduct an incentivized and representative survey among US consumers (N = 1,022) to investigate awareness of climate impact and willingness to mitigate it. We find a large variation in the perceptions of the carbon emissions of different consumption behaviors, with an overall tendency to underestimate these emissions. We also find a positive but highly concave willingness to mitigate climate impact. We combine elicited misperceptions and willingness to mitigate in a structural model that delivers sharp predictions about where to best target information campaigns. In an experiment with actual consumption decisions (N = 2,081), we then test for the effect of CO2 information on the demand for beef, a product predicted to be a productive target for information. Correcting misperceptions has no effect on the demand for beef, both in absolute terms and compared to a predictably less productive target of information, i.e. the demand for poultry. Our dataset allows us to hone in on the underlying reason for this null effect.
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Eternal working papers

(Unless you have an idea to lift this to a new level)

• Inconvenient truths: determinants of strategic ignorance in moral dilemmas, SSRN working paper.
  [.pdf]     Abstract
  People often have incomplete information about the consequences of their actions for the payoffs of others. In an experimental allocation game I investigate how the choice to learn about such consequences depends on the costs and benefits of altruistic actions. The results show an asymmetric pattern: while the size of others’ potential benefit has little effect, ignorance and selfish behavior go up when information is more `inconvenient’, i.e. the fair/efficient alternative is more costly to the decision maker. Thus, in situations of payoff uncertainty, subsidizing fair choices affects prosocial behavior both directly and by increasing the willingness to confront negative consequences of one’s actions.